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Sound management of risks related to money laundering and 
financing of terrorism 
I. Introduction 
1. Being aware of the risks incurred by banks of being used, intentionally or unintentionally, for 
criminal activities, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is issuing these guidelines, whose main 
aim is to describe how banks should include money laundering (ML) and financing of terrorism (FT) risks 
within their overall risk management.  
2. The Committee has had a long-standing commitment to promote the implementation of sound 
Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) policies and procedures that 
are critical in protecting the safety and soundness of banks and the integrity of the international financial 
system. It published an initial statement in 19881 and several documents since then in support of this 
commitment. The Committee also recently reaffirmed this commitment by publishing in September 2012 
the revised version of the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, in which a dedicated principle 
(BCP 29) deals with the abuse of financial services.  
3. The Committee supports the adoption of the standards issued by the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF).2 In February 2012, the FATF released a revised version of the International Standards on 
Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation (the FATF standards), to 
which the Committee provided input.3 In March 2013, the FATF also issued Financial Inclusion Guidance, 
which has also been considered by the Committee for these guidelines. The Committee’s intention in 
issuing this paper is to support countries’ implementation of the FATF standards with respect to their 
banks and banking groups, by exploring complementary areas and leveraging the expertise available in 
both organisations. Therefore, these guidelines are intended to be consistent with and to supplement 
the goals and objectives of the FATF standards. The Committee has included cross-references to FATF 
standards in this document in order to assist banks in complying with national requirements based on 
the implementation of those standards. 
4. The Committee's commitment to combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism 
is fully aligned with its mandate “to strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks 
worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability”. 4 Sound ML/FT risk management has 
particular relevance to the overall safety and soundness of banks and of the banking system, the primary 
objective for banking supervision, in that: 
 
1 See BCBS, Prevention of criminal use of the banking system for the purpose of money-laundering, December 1988, accessible at 
www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc137.pdf 
2 The FATF is an intergovernmental body which develops international standards and promotes policies to protect the global 
financial system against money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. The FATF defines money laundering as the processing of criminal proceeds in order to disguise their illegal 
origin. The FATF works in close cooperation with other entities involved in this area, and in particular FATF associate members 
and observers. The Committee has observer status within the FATF. 
3 Annex 3 contains an excerpt of the most relevant FATF Recommendations that banks and supervisors should comply with 
when implementing their AML/CFT measures. This is not exhaustive and other FATF Recommendations, including the 
Interpretive Notes, may be relevant. The full document is accessible at www.fatf-gafi.org/recommendations. 
4 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Charter, January 2013, accessible at www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.pdf 
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• it contributes to the protection of the reputation of both banks and national banking systems 
by preventing and deterring the use of banks to launder illicit proceeds or to raise or move 
funds in support of terrorism; and 
• it preserves the integrity of the international financial system as well as the work of 
governments in addressing corruption and in combating financing of terrorism. 
5. The inadequacy or absence of sound ML/FT risk management can increase the exposure of 
banks to serious risks, especially reputational, operational, compliance and concentration risks. Recent 
developments, including robust enforcement actions taken by regulators and the corresponding direct 
and indirect costs incurred by banks due to their lack of diligence in applying appropriate risk 
management policies, procedures and controls, have highlighted those risks. These costs and damage 
could probably have been avoided had the banks maintained effective risk-based AML/CFT policies and 
procedures.  
6. It is worth noting that all these risks are interrelated. However, in addition to incurring fines and 
sanctions by regulators, any one of them could result in significant financial costs to banks (eg through 
the termination of wholesale funding and facilities, claims against the bank, investigation costs, asset 
seizures and freezes, and loan losses), as well as the diversion of limited and valuable management time 
and operational resources to resolve problems. 
7. Consequently, this paper should be read in conjunction with a number of related Committee 
papers, including the following: 
• Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, September 20125 
• The internal audit function in banks, June 20126 
• Principles for the Sound Management of Operational Risk, June 20117 
• Principles for enhancing corporate governance, October 20108 
• Due diligence and transparency regarding cover payment messages related to cross-border 
wire transfers, May 20099 
• Compliance and the compliance function in banks, April 200510 
8. In an effort to rationalise the Committee’s publications on AML/CFT guidance, this document 
merges and supersedes two previous publications from the Committee dealing with related topics: 
Customer due diligence for banks, October 2001 and Consolidated KYC Risk Management, October 2004. 
In updating these papers, the Committee has also increased its focus on risks associated with the usage 
by banks of third parties to introduce business (see Annex 1) and the provision of correspondent 
banking services (see Annex 2). Even though they are important and relevant this discussion, other 
specific risk areas such as politically exposed persons (PEPs), private banking and specific legal structures 
addressed in the previous papers have not been specifically developed in this guidance. The Committee 
will consider returning to these risks in future work. 
 
5 Accessible at: www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf 
6 Accessible at: www.bis.org/publ/bcbs223.pdf 
7 Accessible at: www.bis.org/publ/bcbs195.pdf 
8 Accessible at: www.bis.org/publ/bcbs176.pdf 
9 Accessible at: www.bis.org/publ/bcbs154.pdf 
10 Accessible at: www.bis.org/publ/bcbs113.pdf 
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9. With respect to the scope of application, these guidelines should be read in conjunction with 
other standards and guidelines produced by the Committee which promote supervision of banking 
groups on a consolidated level.11 This is particularly relevant in the context of AML/CFT since customers 
frequently have multiple relationships and/or accounts with the same banking group, but in offices 
located in different countries. 
10. These guidelines specifically target banks, banking groups (parts II and III respectively) and 
banking supervisors (part IV). As stated in BCP 29, the Committee is aware of the variety of national 
arrangements that exist for ensuring AML/CFT compliance, in particular, the sharing of supervisory 
functions between banking supervisors and other authorities such as financial intelligence units. 
Therefore, for the purpose of these guidelines, the term “supervisor” might refer to these authorities. In 
jurisdictions where AML/CFT supervisory authority is shared, the banking supervisor cooperates with 
other authorities to seek adherence to these guidelines. 
11. It should be noted that the FATF standards that require countries to apply other measures in 
their financial sectors and other designated non-financial sectors, or establishing powers and 
responsibilities for the competent authorities, are not dealt with in this document. 
The Basel Committee welcomes comments on this consultative document. Comments on the proposals 
should be submitted by Friday 27 September 2013 by e-mail to: baselcommittee@bis.org. 
Alternatively, comments may be sent by post to: Secretariat of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, Bank for International Settlements, CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland. All comments may be 
published on the website of the Bank for International Settlements unless a comment contributor 
explicitly requests confidential treatment. 
II. Essential elements of sound ML/FT risk management 
12. In accordance with the updated Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (2012), all 
banks should be required to “have adequate policies and processes, including strict customer due 
diligence (CDD) rules to promote high ethical and professional standards in the banking sector and 
prevent the bank from being used, intentionally or unintentionally, for criminal activities”. 12 This 
requirement is to be seen as a specific part of the banks’ general obligation to have sound risk 
management programmes in place to address all kinds of risks, including ML and FT risks. Therefore, 
“adequate policies and processes” in this context requires the implementation of other measures in 
addition to CDD rules and compliance with the banks’ own risk assessment of ML/FT risks. This 
document sets out guidance in respect of such measures. In addition, other guidelines (see paragraph 7 
above) are applicable or supplementary where no specific AML/CFT guidance exists.  
 
11 See for example BCP 12 in Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, September 2012. 
12 See BCP 29 in Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, September 2012. 
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1. Assessment, understanding, management and mitigation of risks 
(a) Assessment and understanding of risks 
13. Sound risk management13 requires the identification and analysis of ML/FT risks present within 
the bank and the design and effective implementation of policies and procedures that are 
commensurate with the identified risks. In conducting a comprehensive risk assessment to evaluate 
ML/FT risks, a bank should consider all the relevant inherent and residual risk factors at the country,14 
sectoral, bank and business relationship level, among others, in order to determine its risk profile and 
the appropriate level of mitigation to be applied. The policies and procedures for CDD, customer 
acceptance, customer identification and monitoring of the business relationship and operations (product 
and service offered) will then have to take into account the risk assessment and the resulting risk profile 
of the bank. A bank should have appropriate mechanisms to document and provide risk assessment 
information to competent authorities such as supervisors. 
14. A bank should develop a thorough understanding of the inherent ML/FT risks present in its 
customer base, products and services offered (including products under development or to be launched) 
and the jurisdictions within which it or its customers do business. This understanding should be based 
on specific operational and transaction data and other internal information collected by the bank as well 
as external sources of information such as national risk assessments and country reports from 
international organisations. Policies and procedures for customer acceptance, due diligence and ongoing 
monitoring should be designed and implemented to adequately control those identified inherent risks. 
Any resulting residual risk should be managed in line with the bank’s risk profile established through its 
risk assessment. This assessment and understanding should be able to be demonstrated as required by, 
and should be acceptable to, the bank’s supervisor.   
(b)  Proper governance arrangements 
15. Effective ML/FT risk management requires proper governance arrangements such as described 
in relevant previous publications of the Committee.15 In particular, the requirement for the board of 
directors to approve and oversee the policies for risk, risk management and compliance is fully relevant 
in the context of ML/FT risk. The board of directors should have a clear understanding of ML/FT risks. 
Information about ML/FT risk assessment should be communicated to the board in a timely, complete, 
understandable and accurate manner so that it is equipped to make informed decisions.  
16. Explicit responsibility should be allocated by the board of directors effectively taking into 
consideration the governance structure of the bank for ensuring that the bank's policies and procedures 
are managed effectively. The board of directors and senior management should appoint an 
appropriately qualified chief AML/CFT officer to have overall responsibility for the AML/CFT function with 
the stature and the necessary authority within the bank such that issues raised by this senior officer 
receive the necessary attention from the board, senior management and business lines. 
 
13 See in particular BCP 15 in Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, September 2012 as well as Principle 6 in Principles 
for enhancing corporate governance, October 2010. 
14  Where appropriate, AML/CFT risk assessments at a supranational level should be taken into account. 
15  See in particular The internal audit function in banks, June 2012; Principles for enhancing corporate governance, October 2010; 
Compliance and the compliance function in banks, April 2005. 
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(c) The three lines of defence 
17. As a general rule and in the context of AML/CFT, the business units (eg front office, customer-
facing activity) are the first line of defence in charge of identifying, assessing and controlling the risks of 
their business. They should know and carry out the policies and procedures and be allotted sufficient 
resources to do this effectively. The second line of defence includes the chief officer in charge of 
AML/CFT, the compliance function but also human resources or technology. The third line of defence is 
ensured by the internal audit function. 
18. As part of the first line of defence, policies and procedures should be clearly specified in 
writing, and communicated to all personnel. They should contain a clear description for employees of 
their obligations and instructions as well as guidance on how to keep the activity of the bank in 
compliance with regulations. There should be internal procedures for detecting and reporting suspicious 
transactions.  
19. A bank should have adequate policies and processes for screening prospective and existing 
staff to ensure high ethical and professional standards for hiring staff. All banks should implement 
ongoing employee training programmes so that bank staff are adequately trained to implement the 
bank’s AML/CFT policies and procedures. The timing and content of training for various sectors of staff 
will need to be adapted by the bank according to their needs and the bank’s risk profile. Training needs 
will vary depending on staff functions and job responsibilities and length of service with the bank. 
Training course organisation and materials should be tailored to an employee’s specific responsibility or 
function to ensure that the employee has sufficient knowledge and information to effectively implement 
the bank’s AML/CFT policies and procedures. New employees should be required to attend training as 
soon as possible after being hired, for the same reasons. Refresher training should be provided to ensure 
that staff are reminded of their obligations and their knowledge and expertise are up to date. The scope 
and frequency of such training should be tailored in light of the risk factors to which employees are 
exposed due to their responsibilities and the level and nature of risk present in the bank.  
20. As part of the second line of defence, the chief officer in charge of AML/CFT should have the 
responsibility for ongoing monitoring of the fulfilment of all AML/CFT duties by the bank. This implies 
sample testing of compliance and review of exception reports to alert senior management or the board 
of directors if it is believed management is failing to address AML/CFT procedures in a responsible 
manner. The chief AML/CFT officer should be the contact point regarding all AML/CFT issues for internal 
and external authorities, including supervisory authorities or financial intelligence units (FIUs).  
21. The business interests of a bank should in no way be opposed to the effective discharge of the 
above-mentioned responsibilities of the chief AML/CFT officer. Regardless of the size of the bank or its 
management structure, potential conflicts of interest should be avoided. Therefore, to enable unbiased 
judgments and facilitate impartial advice to management, the chief AML/CFT officer should, for example, 
not have business lines responsibilities and should not be entrusted with responsibilities in the context 
of data protection or the function of internal audit. Where any conflicts between business lines and the 
responsibilities of the chief AML/CFT officer arise, procedures should be in place to ensure AML/CFT 
concerns are objectively considered at the highest level.   
22.  The chief AML/CFT officer may also perform the function of the chief risk officer or the chief 
compliance officer or equivalent. He/she should have a direct reporting line to senior management or 
the board. In case of a separation of duties the relationship between the aforementioned chief officers 
and their respective roles must be clearly defined and understood.   
23. The chief AML/CFT officer should also have the responsibility for reporting suspicious 
transactions. The chief AML/CFT officer should be provided with sufficient resources to execute all 
responsibilities effectively and play a central and proactive role in the bank’s AML/CFT regime. In order 
to do so, he/she must be fully conversant with the bank’s AML/CFT regime, its statutory and regulatory 
requirements and the ML/FT risks arising from the business.   
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24. Internal audit, the third line of defence, plays an important role in independently evaluating 
the risk management and controls, and discharges its responsibility to the audit committee of the board 
of directors or a similar oversight body through periodic evaluations of the effectiveness of compliance 
with AML/CFT policies and procedures. A bank should establish policies for conducting audits of i) the 
adequacy of the bank’s AML/CFT policies and procedures in addressing identified risks, ii) the 
effectiveness of bank staff in implementing the bank’s policies and procedures; iii) the effectiveness of 
compliance oversight and quality control including parameters of criteria for automatic alerts; and iv) the 
effectiveness of the bank’s training of relevant personnel. Senior management should ensure that audit 
functions are allocated staff who are knowledgeable and have the appropriate expertise to conduct such 
audits. Management should also ensure that the audit scope and methodology are appropriate for the 
banks’ risk profile and that the frequency of such audits is also based on risk. Periodically, internal 
auditors should conduct AML/CFT audits on a bank-wide basis. In addition, internal auditors should be 
proactive in following up their findings and recommendations.16 As a general rule, the processes used in 
auditing should be consistent with internal audit’s broader audit mandate, subject to any prescribed 
auditing requirements applicable to AML/CFT measures. 
25. In many countries, external auditors also have an important role to play in evaluating banks’ 
internal controls and procedures in the course of their financial audits, and in confirming that they are 
compliant with AML/CFT regulations and supervisory practice. In cases where a bank uses external 
auditors to evaluate the effectiveness of AML/CFT policies and procedures, it should ensure that the 
scope of the audit is adequate to address the bank’s risks and that the auditors assigned to the 
engagement have the requisite expertise and experience. A bank should also ensure that it exercises 
appropriate oversight of such engagements. 
(d) Adequate IT systems 
26 A bank should have IT monitoring systems in place that are adequate for the risks faced. Such 
IT monitoring systems should cover all accounts of the bank’s customers and transactions for the benefit 
of, or by order of, the customer. The systems must enable the bank to check business relationships with 
its customers against risks and abnormal situations, which may be associated with ML or FT. 
27. In particular, these systems should be able to provide accurate information for senior 
management relating to several key aspects, including changes in the transactional profile of customers. 
In compiling the customer’s profile, the bank should incorporate the updated, comprehensive and 
accurate CDD information provided to it by the customer. The IT systems should also have aggregation 
capabilities (by customer, product, across group entities, transactions carried out during a certain 
timeframe, etc) and be able to handle a risk grading of customers and the management of alerts. IT 
monitoring systems must use adequate parameters based on the national and international experience 
on the methods and the prevention of ML or FT. A bank may make use of the standard parameters 
provided by the developer of the IT monitoring system; however, the parameters used must reflect and 
take into account the bank’s own risk situation.   
28. The IT monitoring systems should enable a bank to determine its own criteria for additional 
monitoring, filing a suspicious transaction report or taking other steps in order to minimise the risk. The 
chief AML/CFT officer should have access to and benefit from the IT systems as far as they are relevant 
for his/her function (even if operated or used by other business lines). Parameters of the IT systems 
should allow for generation of alerts of unusual transactions that should then be subject to further 
assessment by the chief AML/CFT officer. Any risk criteria used in this context should be adequate with 
regard to the risk assessment of the bank. 
 
16  See BCBS, The internal audit function in banks, June 2012. 
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29. Internal audit should also evaluate the IT systems to ensure that they are appropriate and 
controlled and used effectively by the first and second lines of defence. 
2. Customer acceptance policy 
30. A bank should develop and implement clear customer acceptance policies and procedures to 
identify the types of customer that are likely to pose a higher risk of ML and FT pursuant to the bank’s 
risk assessment.17 When assessing the risk, a bank should consider all relevant factors such as a 
customer’s background, occupation (including a public or high-profile position), source of income and 
wealth, country of origin and residence (when different), use and purpose of accounts, linked accounts, 
business activities or other customer-oriented risk indicators before determining what is the level of 
overall risk and the appropriate measures to be applied.  
31. Such policies and procedures should require basic due diligence for all customers and 
enhanced due diligence as the level of risk associated with the customer increases. For example, the 
application of basic account-opening procedures may be appropriate for an individual who expects to 
maintain a small account balance and use it to conduct routine retail banking transactions. It is 
important that the customer acceptance policy is not so restrictive that it results in a denial of access by 
the general public to banking services, especially for people who are financially or socially 
disadvantaged. The FATF Financial Inclusion Guidance 18  provides useful guidelines on designing 
AML/CFT procedures that are not overly restrictive to the financially or socially disadvantaged. Enhanced 
due diligence may be essential for an individual planning to maintain a large account balance and 
conduct regular cross-border wire transfers or an individual who is a politically exposed person (PEP). In 
particular, such enhanced due diligence is required for foreign PEPs. Decisions to enter into or pursue 
business relationships with higher-risk customers should entail enhanced due diligence measures, such 
as approval to enter into or continue such relationships, being taken by senior management. The bank’s 
customer acceptance policy should also define circumstances under which the bank would not accept a 
new business relationship or would terminate an existing one.  
3. Customer and beneficial owner identification, verification and risk profiling 
32. The FATF standards require banks to identify the customers and verify their identity, unless the 
country19 has determined through a risk assessment that particular types of activities (and customers 
associated with the activities) may, on a limited basis, be exempted because there is a proven low risk of 
ML or FT. For the purposes of this paper, a customer refers to any person20 who enters into a business 
relationship or financial transaction with the bank.  
33. A bank should establish a systematic procedure for identifying and verifying its customers and, 
where applicable, any beneficial owner(s). Generally, a bank should not establish a banking relationship, 
nor carry out any transactions, until the identity of the customer has been satisfactorily verified (in 
 
17  The FATF standards also include useful guidelines on how the bank may effectively implement a risk-based approach (see in 
particular Recommendation 1). 
18  See FATF, Guidance on Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing and Financial Inclusion, February 2013 accessible at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/financialinclusion/ 
19  See Interpretative note to recommendation 10 in the FATF Standards. 
20  “Person” in this context refers to natural and legal persons or legal arrangements.  
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accordance with any prescribed documentation requirements). Consistent with BCP 2921 and the FATF 
standards, the procedures should also include the identification of the beneficial owner22 and the taking 
of reasonable measures to verify the identity of the beneficial owner. A bank should also verify that any 
person acting on behalf of the customer is so authorised, and should verify the identity of that person. 
34. The identity of customers, beneficial owners, as well as persons acting on behalf of customers, 
should be verified by using reliable, independent source documents, data or information. When relying 
on documents, a bank should be aware that the best documents for the verification of identity are those 
most difficult to obtain illicitly or to counterfeit. When relying on other sources than documents, the 
bank must ensure that the methods (which may include checking references with other financial 
institutions and obtaining financial statements) and sources of information are appropriate, and in 
accordance with the bank’s policies and procedures and risk profile of the customer. A bank may require 
customers to complete a written declaration of the identity and details of the beneficial owner, though 
the bank should not rely solely on such declarations. As for all elements of the CDD process, a bank 
should also consider the nature and level of risk presented by a customer when determining the extent 
of the applicable due diligence measures. 23  In no case should a bank disregard its customer 
identification and verification procedures just because the customer is unable to be present for an 
interview (non-face-to-face customer); the bank should also take into account risk factors such as why 
the customer has chosen to open an account far away from its seat/office, in particular in a foreign 
jurisdiction. It would also be important to take into account the relevant risks associated with customers 
from jurisdictions that are known to have AML/CFT strategic deficiencies and apply enhanced due 
diligence when this is called for by the FATF, other international bodies or national authorities. 
35. While the customer identification and verification process is applicable at the outset of the 
relationship or before an occasional banking transaction is carried out, a bank should use this 
information to build an understanding of the customer’s profile and behaviour. The purpose of the 
relationship or the occasional banking transaction, the level of assets or the size of transactions of the 
customer, and the regularity or duration of the relationship are examples of information typically 
collected. Therefore, a bank should also have policies and procedures in place to conduct due diligence 
on its customers sufficient to develop customer risk profiles either for particular customers or categories 
of customers. These profiles will facilitate the identification of any account activity that deviates from 
activity or behaviour that would be considered “normal” for the particular customer or customer 
category and could be considered as potentially suspicious or unusual. Customer risk profiles will assist 
the bank in further determining if the customer or customer category is higher-risk and requires the 
application of enhanced CDD measures and controls. The profiles should also reflect the bank’s 
understanding of the intended purpose and nature of the business relationship/account, sources of 
customer funds or income and wealth, expected level of activity and type of transactions, and other 
similar considerations. Any information collected on customer activity or behaviour should be used in 
updating the bank’s risk assessment. 
36. A bank should obtain customer identification papers as well as any information and 
documentation obtained as a result of CDD conducted on the customer. This could include copies of or 
records of official documents (eg passports, identity cards, driving licences), account files (eg financial 
transaction records) and business correspondence, including the results of any analysis undertaken such 
 
21  See BCP 29, essential criterion 5(b) in Core principles for Effective Banking Supervision, September 2012. 
22  The FATF defines a “beneficial owner” as the natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls a customer and/or natural 
person on whose behalf a transaction is being conducted. It also includes those persons who exercise ultimate effective 
control over a legal person or arrangement.  
23  See World Bank, Politically Exposed Persons, Preventive Measures for the Banking Sector,2010. 
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as the risk assessment and inquiries to establish the background and purpose of the relationships and 
activities. 
37. A bank should also obtain all the information necessary to establish to its full satisfaction the 
identity of their customer and the identity of any person acting on behalf of the customer and of 
beneficial owners. While a bank is required to both identify its customers and verify their identities, the 
nature and extent of the information required for verification will depend on risk assessment, including 
the type of applicant (personal, corporate, etc), and the expected size and use of the account. The 
specific requirements involved in ascertaining the identity of natural persons are usually prescribed in 
national legislation. Higher-risk customers will require the application of enhanced due diligence to 
verify customer identity. If the relationship is complex, or if the size of the account is significant, 
additional identification measures may be advisable, and these should be determined based on the level 
of overall risk.  
38. When a bank is unable to complete CDD measures, it should not open the account, commence 
business relations or perform the transaction. However, there may be circumstances where it would be 
permissible for verification to be completed after the establishment of the business relationship, because 
it would be essential not to interrupt the normal conduct of business. In such circumstances, the bank 
should adopt adequate risk management procedures with respect to the conditions and restrictions 
under which a customer may utilise the banking relationship prior to verification. In situations where an 
account has been opened, but problems of verification arise during the course of the establishment of 
the banking relationship which cannot be resolved, the bank should close or otherwise block access to 
the account. In any event, the bank should consider filing a suspicious transaction report in cases where 
there are problems with completion of the CDD measures.24 Additionally, where CDD checks raise 
suspicion or reasonable grounds to suspect that the assets or funds of the prospective customer may be 
the proceeds of predicate offences and crimes related to ML/FT, banks should not voluntarily agree to 
open accounts with such customers. For such situations, a suspicious transaction report should also be 
filed with the relevant authorities accordingly. 
39. A bank should have in place procedures and material capacity enabling front office, customer-
facing activities to identify any designated entities or individuals (eg terrorists, terrorist organisations) in 
accordance with their national legislation and the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
(UNSCRs).  
40. While the transfer of funds from an account in the customer’s name in another bank subject to 
the same CDD standard as the initial deposit may provide some comfort, a bank should nevertheless 
conduct its own due diligence and consider the possibility that the previous account manager may have 
asked for the account to be closed because of a concern about illicit activities. Naturally, customers have 
the right to move their business from one bank to another. However, if a bank has any reason to believe 
that an applicant has been refused banking facilities by another bank due to concerns over illicit 
activities of the customer, it should consider classifying that applicant as higher-risk and apply enhanced 
due diligence procedures to the customer and the relationship, filing a suspicious transaction report 
and/or not accepting the customer in accordance with its own risk assessments and procedures. 
41. A bank should not open an account or conduct ongoing business with a customer who insists 
on anonymity or who gives a fictitious name. Nor should confidential numbered25 accounts function as 
anonymous accounts but they should be subject to exactly the same CDD procedures as all other 
 
24  Subject to any national legislation concerning handling of suspicious transactions. 
25 In a numbered account, the name of the beneficial owner is known to the bank but is substituted by an account number or 
code name in subsequent documentation. 
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customers’ accounts, even if the procedures are carried out by selected staff. Whilst a numbered account 
can offer additional confidentiality for the account-holder, such holder’s identity must be verified by the 
bank and known to a sufficient number of staff to operate proper due diligence, especially if the 
customer is higher-risk. A bank should ensure that its internal control, compliance, audit and other 
oversight functions, in particular the chief AML/CFT officer, and the bank’s supervisors, have full access 
to this information as needed. 
4. Ongoing monitoring 
42. Ongoing monitoring is an essential aspect of effective sound ML/FT risk management. A bank 
can only effectively manage its risks if it has an understanding of the normal and reasonable banking 
activity of its customers that enables the bank to identify attempted and unusual transactions which fall 
outside the regular pattern of the banking activity. Without such knowledge, the bank is likely to fail in 
its obligations to identify and report suspicious transactions to the appropriate authorities. Ongoing 
monitoring should be conducted in relation to all business relationships and transactions, but the extent 
of the monitoring should be based on risk as identified in the bank risk assessment and its CDD efforts. 
Enhanced monitoring should be adopted for higher-risk customers or transactions. A bank should not 
only monitor its customers and their transactions, but should also carry out cross-sectional 
product/service monitoring in order to identify and mitigate emerging risk patterns. 
43. All banks should have systems in place to detect unusual or suspicious transactions or patterns 
of activity. In establishing scenarios for identifying such activity, a bank should consider the customer’s 
risk profile developed as a result of the bank’s risk assessment, information collected during its CDD 
efforts, and other information obtained from law enforcement and other authorities in its jurisdiction. 
For example, a bank may be aware of particular schemes or arrangements to launder proceeds of crime 
that may have been identified by authorities as occurring within its jurisdiction. As part of its risk 
assessment process, it will have assessed the risk that activity associated with such schemes or 
arrangements may be occurring within the bank through a category of customers, group of accounts, 
transaction pattern or product usage. Based on this knowledge, the bank should design and apply 
appropriate monitoring tools and controls to identify such activity. These could be through alert 
scenarios for computerised monitoring systems or setting limits for a particular class or category of 
activity, for instance.  
44. Using CDD information, a bank should be able to identify transactions that do not appear to 
make economic sense, or that involve large amounts of cash deposits that are not consistent with the 
normal and expected transactions of the customer.  
45. A bank should have established enhanced due diligence policies and procedures for customers 
who have been identified as higher-risk by the bank. In addition to established policies and procedures 
relating to approvals for account opening, a bank should also have specific policies regarding the extent 
and nature of required CDD, frequency of ongoing account monitoring and updating of CDD 
information and other records. The ability of the bank to effectively monitor and identify suspicious 
activity would require access to updated, comprehensive and accurate customer profiles and records.  
46. A bank should ensure that they have appropriate integrated management information systems, 
commensurate with its size, organisational structure or complexity, based on materiality and risks, to 
provide both business units (eg relationship managers) and compliance officers (including investigating 
staff) with timely information needed to identify, analyse and effectively monitor customer accounts. The 
systems used and the information available should support the monitoring of such customer 
relationships across lines of business and include all the available information on that customer 
relationship including transaction history, missing account opening documentation and significant 
changes in the customer’s behaviour or business profile, transactions made through a customer account 
that are unusual, and aggregations of a customer’s total relationship with the bank. 
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47. The bank should screen its customer database whenever there are changes to sanction lists. The 
bank should also screen its customer database using screening databases periodically to detect PEP and 
other high-risk accounts and subject them to enhanced due diligence. 
5. Management of information  
(a)  Record keeping 
48. A bank should ensure that all information obtained in the context of CDD is recorded. This 
includes both (i) recording the documents the bank is provided with when verifying the identity of the 
customer or the beneficial owner, and (ii) transcription of the relevant CDD information contained in 
such documents or obtained by other means into the bank’s own IT systems. 
49. A bank should also develop and implement clear rules on the records that must be kept to 
document due diligence conducted on customers and individual transactions. These rules should take 
into account, if possible, any prescribed privacy measures. They should include a definition of the types 
of information and documentation that should be included in the records as well as the retention period 
for such records, which should be at least five years from the termination of the banking relationship or 
the occasional transaction.26 Even if accounts are closed, in the event of ongoing investigation/ litigation, 
all records should be retained until the closure of the case. Maintaining complete and updated records is 
essential for a bank to adequately monitor its relationship with its customer, to understand the 
customer’s ongoing business and activities, and, if necessary, to provide an audit trail in the event of 
disputes, legal action, or inquiries or investigations that could lead to regulatory actions or criminal 
prosecution.  
50. Adequate records documenting the evaluation process related to ongoing monitoring and 
review and any conclusions drawn should also be maintained and will help to demonstrate the bank’s 
compliance with CDD requirements and ability to manage ML and FT risk. 
(b) Updating of information 
51. Only if banks ensure that records remain accurate, up-to-date and relevant by undertaking 
regular reviews of existing records and updating the CDD information can other competent authorities, 
law enforcement agencies or financial intelligence units27 make effective use of that information in order 
to fulfil their own responsibilities in the context of AML/CFT. In addition, keeping up-to-date information 
will affect the bank’s ability to effectively monitor the account for potential suspicious activities. 
(c)  Supplying information to the supervisors 
52. A bank should be able to demonstrate to its supervisors, on request, the adequacy of its 
assessment, management and mitigation of ML/FT risks; its customer acceptance policy; its procedures 
and policies concerning customer identification and verification; its ongoing monitoring and procedures 
for reporting suspicious transaction reports; and all measures taken in the context of AML/CFT. 
 
26  See BCP 29, essential criterion 5(f) in Core principles for Effective Banking Supervision, September 2012. 
27 Financial intelligence units are described in Recommendation 26 in the FATF Standards. 
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6.  Reporting of suspicious transactions and asset freezing  
(a)  Reporting of suspicious transactions 
53. Ongoing monitoring and review of accounts and transactions will enable banks to identify 
suspicious activity, eliminate false positives and report promptly genuine suspicious transactions. The 
process for identifying, investigating and reporting suspicious transactions to the FIU should be clearly 
specified in the bank’s policies and procedures and communicated to all personnel through regular 
training. These policies and procedures should contain a clear description for employees of their 
obligations and instructions for the analysis, investigation and reporting of such activity within the bank 
as well as guidance on how to complete such reports.  
54. There should also be established procedures for assessing whether the bank’s statutory 
obligations under recognised suspicious activity reporting regimes require the transaction to be 
reported to the appropriate law enforcement agency or FIU and/or supervisory authorities, if relevant. 
These procedures should also reflect the principle of confidentiality, ensure that investigation is 
conducted swiftly and that reports contain relevant information and are produced and submitted in a 
timely manner. The chief AML/CFT officer should ensure prompt disclosures where funds or other 
property that is suspected to be the proceeds of crime remain in an account. 
55. Once suspicion has been raised in relation to an account or relationship, in addition to 
reporting the suspicious activity, a bank should ensure that appropriate action such as a review of the 
relationship and risk classification is taken in cooperation with law-enforcement agencies or the FIU to 
adequately mitigate the risk of the bank being used for criminal activities.  
(b)  Asset freezing 
56. Financing of terrorism has similarities compared to money laundering, but it also has 
specificities that banks should take into due consideration: funds that are used to finance terrorist 
activities may be derived either from criminal activity or from legal sources, and the nature of the 
funding sources may vary according to the type of terrorist organisation. In addition, it should be noted 
that transactions associated with the financing of terrorists may be conducted in very small amounts. 
57. A bank should be able to identify and to enforce funds freezing decisions made by the 
competent authority and it should otherwise not deal with any designated entities or individuals (eg 
terrorists, terrorist organisations) consistent with their national legislation and the relevant UNSCRs. 
58. CDD should help a bank to detect and identify potential FT transactions, providing important 
elements for a better knowledge of its customers and the transactions they conduct. In developing 
customer acceptance policies and procedures, a bank should give proper relevance to the specific risks 
of entering into or pursuing business with individuals or entities linked to terrorist groups. Before 
establishing a business relationship or carrying out an occasional transaction with new customers, a bank 
should screen customers against lists of known or suspected terrorists issued by competent (national 
and international) authorities. Likewise, ongoing monitoring should verify that existing customers are not 
entered into these same lists.  
59. All banks should have systems in place to detect prohibited transactions (eg transactions with 
entities designated by the relevant UNSCRs or national sanctions). Terrorist screening is not a risk-
sensitive due diligence measure and should be carried out irrespective of the risk profile attributed to 
the customer. For the purpose of terrorist screening, a bank may adopt automatic screening systems, but 
it should ensure that such systems are fit for purpose. A bank should freeze without delay and without 
prior notice the funds or other assets of designated persons and entities, following applicable laws and 
regulations. 
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III. AML/CFT in a group-wide and cross-border context 
60. Sound ML/FT risk management where a bank operates in other jurisdictions entails 
consideration of host country legal requirements. Given the risks, each group should develop group-
wide AML/CFT policies and procedures consistently applied and supervised across the group. In turn, 
policies and procedures at the branch or subsidiary levels, even though reflecting local business 
considerations and the requirements of the host jurisdiction, must still be consistent with and supportive 
of the group’s broader policies and procedures.28 In cases where the host jurisdiction requirements are 
stricter than the group’s, group policy should allow the relevant branch or subsidiary to adopt and 
implement the host jurisdiction local requirements. 
1. Global process for managing customer risks 
61. Consolidated risk management means establishing and administering a centralised process to 
coordinate and apply uniform policies and procedures on a group-wide basis, thereby implementing a 
consistent and comprehensive baseline for managing the bank’s risks across its international operations. 
Policies and procedures should be designed not merely to comply strictly with all relevant laws and 
regulations, but more broadly to identify, monitor and mitigate group-wide risks. Every effort should be 
made to ensure that the group’s ability to obtain and review information in accordance with its global 
AML/CFT policies and procedures is not impaired as a result of modifications to local policies or 
procedures necessitated by local legal requirements. In this regard, a bank should have robust 
information sharing among the head office and all of its branches and subsidiaries. Where the minimum 
regulatory or legal requirements of the home and host countries differ, offices in host jurisdictions 
should apply the higher standard of the two.  
62. Furthermore, according to FATF Standards,29 if the host country does not permit the proper 
implementation of those standards, the chief AML/CFT officer should inform the home supervisors. 
Additional measures should be considered, including, as appropriate, the financial group closing its 
operations in the host country. 
63. The Committee recognises that implementing group-wide AML/CFT procedures is more 
challenging than many other risk management processes because some jurisdictions continue to restrict 
the ability of banks to transmit customer names and balances across national borders. For effective 
group-wide monitoring and for ML/FT risk management purposes, it is essential that banks be 
authorised to share information about their customers, subject to adequate legal protection, with their 
head offices or parent bank. This applies in the case of both branches and subsidiaries. 
2. Risk assessment and management 
64. The bank should have a thorough understanding of all the risks associated with its customers 
across the group, either individually or as a category, and should document and update these on a 
regular basis, commensurate with the level and nature of risk in the group. In assessing customer risk, a 
 
28 The term “group” is used in this paper to refer to an organisation’s one or more banks, and the branches and subsidiaries of 
those banks. The term “head office” is used in this paper to refer also to the parent bank or to the unit in which AML/CFT risk 
management is performed on a business line basis.  
29  See Interpretative Note to recommendation 18 (Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries) in the FATF 
Standards. 
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bank should identify all relevant risk factors such as geographical location and patterns of transaction 
activity (declared or self-stated) and usage of bank products and services and establish criteria for 
identifying higher-risk customers. These criteria should be applied across the bank, its branches and its 
subsidiaries and through outsourced activities (see Annex 1). Customers that pose a higher risk of ML/FT 
to the bank should be identified across the group using these criteria. Customer risk assessments should 
be applied on a group-wide basis or at least be consistent with the group-wide risk assessment. Taking 
into account differences in risks associated with customer categories, group policy should recognise that 
customers in the same category may pose different risks in different jurisdictions. For example, while 
PEPs constitute a higher-risk customer category that is applicable across a group, the specific risks 
associated with sub-categories of PEPs may vary by jurisdiction. The information collected in the 
assessment process should then be used to determine the level and nature of overall group risk and 
support the design of appropriate group controls to mitigate these risks. The mitigating factors can 
comprise additional information from the customer, tighter monitoring, more frequent updating of 
personal data and visits by bank staff to the customer location. 
65. Banks’ compliance and internal audit staff, in particular the chief AML/CFT officer, or external 
auditors, should evaluate compliance with all aspects of their group’s policies and procedures, including 
the effectiveness of centralised CDD functions and the requirements for sharing information with other 
group members and responding to queries from head office. Internationally active banking groups 
should ensure that they have a strong internal audit and a global compliance function since these are 
the primary mechanisms for monitoring the overall application of the bank’s global CDD and the 
effectiveness of its policies and procedures for sharing information within the group. This should include 
the responsibility of a chief AML/CFT officer for group-wide compliance with all relevant AML/CFT duties 
nationally and abroad (see paragraphs 72 and 73). 
3. Consolidated AML/CFT policies and procedures  
66. A bank should ensure it understands the extent to which AML/CFT legislation allows it to rely 
on the procedures undertaken by other banks (for example within the same group) when business is 
being referred. A bank should not rely on introducers that are subject to standards that are less strict 
than those governing the bank’s own AML/CFT procedures. This will entail banks monitoring and 
evaluating the AML/CFT standards in place in the jurisdiction of the referring bank. A bank may rely on 
an introducer that is part of the same financial group and could consider placing a higher level of 
reliance on the information provided by this introducer, provided this introducer is subject to the same 
standards as the bank, and the application of these requirements is supervised at the group level. A bank 
taking this approach should ensure, however, that it obtains customer information from the referring 
bank (as further detailed in Annex 1), as this information may be required to be reported to FIUs in the 
event that a transaction involving the referred customer is determined to be suspicious. 
67. Relevant information should be accessible by the banking group’s head office for the purpose 
of enforcing group AML/CFT policies and procedures. Each office of the banking group should be in a 
position to comply with minimum AML/CFT and accessibility policies and procedures applied by the 
head office and defined consistently with the Committee guidelines.  
68. Customer acceptance, CDD and record keeping policies and procedures should be 
implemented through the consistent application of uniform policies and procedures throughout the 
organisation, with adjustments as necessary to address variations in risk according to specific business 
lines or geographical areas of operation. Moreover, it is recognised that different approaches to 
information collection and retention may be necessary across jurisdictions to conform to local regulatory 
requirements or relative risk factors. However, these approaches should be consistent with the group-
wide standards discussed above. 
69. Regardless of its location, each office should establish and maintain effective monitoring 
policies and procedures that are appropriate to the risks present in the jurisdiction and in the bank. This 
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local monitoring should be complemented by a robust process of information sharing with the head 
office, and if appropriate with other branches and subsidiaries regarding accounts and activity that may 
represent heightened risk. 
70. To effectively manage the ML and FT risks arising from such accounts, a bank should carry out 
this aggregation based on it knowledge of the beneficial ownership of the customer and the funds and 
not only for the nominal/formal customer. A bank should monitor significant customer relationships, 
balances and activity on a consolidated basis, regardless of whether the accounts are held on balance 
sheet, off balance sheet, as assets under management or on a fiduciary basis, and regardless of where 
they are held. The FATF standards have now also set out more details relating to banks’ head office 
oversight of group compliance, audit and/or AML/CFT functions.30 Moreover, if these guidelines have 
been conceived primarily for banks, they might be of interest for conglomerates (including banks). 
71. Many banks centralise certain processing systems and databases for more effective 
management or efficiency purposes. In implementing this approach, a bank should adequately 
document and integrate the local and centralised transaction/account monitoring functions to ensure 
that it has the opportunity to monitor for patterns of potential suspicious activity across the group and 
not just at either the local or centralised levels. 
72. A bank performing business nationally and abroad should appoint a chief AML/CFT officer for 
the whole group (group AML/CFT officer). The group AML/CFT officer has responsibility, as a part of the 
global risk management, for creating, coordinating and group-wide assessment of the implementation 
of a single AML/CFT strategy (including mandatory policies and procedures and the authorisation to give 
orders for all branches, subsidiaries and subordinated entities nationally and abroad).  
73. The function of the group AML/CFT officer includes ongoing monitoring of the fulfilment of all 
AML/CFT duties on a group-wide basis, nationally and abroad. Therefore, the group AML/CFT officer 
should satisfy him/herself (including through on-site visits on a regular basis) that compliance is given 
within the whole group. If needed, he/she should be empowered to give orders or take the necessary 
measures for the whole group. 
4. Group-wide information sharing 
74. A banks should oversee on a centralised basis the coordination of information sharing. 
Subsidiaries and branches should be required to proactively provide the head office with information 
concerning higher-risk customers and activities relevant to the global AML/CFT standards, and respond 
to requests for account information from the head office or parent bank in a timely manner. The bank’s 
group-wide standards should include a description of the process to be followed in all locations for 
monitoring, identifying, investigating and reporting potentially suspicious activity. 
75. The bank’s group-wide policies and procedures should take into account issues and obligations 
related to local data protection and privacy laws and regulations. They should also take into account the 
different types of information that may be shared within a group and the requirements for storage, 
retrieval, sharing/distribution and disposal of this information. 
76. The group’s overall ML/FT risk management function should evaluate the potential risks posed 
by activity reported by its branches and subsidiaries and, where appropriate, assess the group-wide risks 
presented by a given customer or category of customers. It should have policies and procedures to 
ascertain if other branches or subsidiaries hold accounts for the same customer (including any related or 
 
30  See in particular Recommendation 18 in the FATF Standards. 
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affiliated parties) party. The bank should also have policies and procedures governing global account 
relationships that are deemed higher-risk or have been associated with potentially suspicious activity, 
including escalation procedures and guidance on restricting account activities, including the closing of 
accounts as appropriate. 
77. In addition, a bank and its branches and subsidiaries should, in accordance with their respective 
domestic laws, be responsive to requests from law enforcement agencies, supervisory authorities or FIUs 
for information about customers that is needed in their efforts to combat ML and FT. A bank’s head 
office should be able to require all branches and subsidiaries to search their files against specified lists or 
requests for individuals or organisations suspected of aiding and abetting ML and FT, and report 
matches. 
78. A bank should be able to inform its supervisors, if so requested, about its global process for 
managing customer risks, its risk assessment and management of ML/FT risks, its consolidated AML/CFT 
policies and procedures, and its group-wide information sharing arrangements. 
5. Mixed financial groups 
79. Many banking groups engage in securities and insurance businesses. The application of ML/FT 
risk management controls in mixed financial groups poses additional issues that may not be present for 
deposit-taking and lending operations. Mixed groups should have the ability to monitor and share 
information on the identity of customers and their transaction and account activities across the entire 
group, and be alert to customers that use their services in different sectors, as described in paragraph 76 
above. 
80. Differences in the nature of activities and patterns of relationships between banks and 
customers in each sector may require or justify variations in the AML/CFT requirements imposed on each 
sector. The group should be alert to these differences when cross-selling products and services to 
customers from different business arms, and the appropriate AML/CFT requirements for the relevant 
sectors should be applied. 
IV. The role of supervisors 
81. Banking supervisors are expected to comply with FATF Recommendation 26, which states in 
part: “For financial institutions subject to the Core Principles, the regulatory and supervisory measures 
that apply for prudential purposes, and which are also relevant to money laundering and financing of 
terrorism, should apply in a similar manner for AML/CFT purposes. This should include applying 
consolidated group supervision for AML/CFT purposes.” The Committee expects supervisors to apply the 
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision to banks’ ML/FT risk management in a manner consistent 
with and supportive of the supervisors’ overall supervision of banks. Supervisors should be able to apply 
a range of effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions in cases when banks fail to comply with their 
AML/CFT requirements. 
82. Banking supervisors are expected to set out supervisory expectations governing banks’ 
AML/CFT policies and procedures. The essential elements as set out in this paper should provide clear 
guidance for supervisors to proceed with the work of designing or improving national supervisory 
practice. National supervisors are encouraged to provide guidance to assist banks in designing their own 
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customer identification policies and procedures. The Committee has therefore developed two specific 
topic guides in Annexes 1 and 2, which could be used by supervisors for this purpose. 
83. Supervisors should adopt a risk-based approach to supervising banks’ ML/FT risk 
management.31 Such an approach requires that supervisors i) develop a thorough understanding of the 
risks present in the jurisdiction and their potential impact on the supervised entities; 32 ii) evaluate the 
adequacy of the bank’s risk assessment based on the jurisdiction’s national risk assessment(s); 33 
iii) assess the risks present in the target supervised entity to understand the nature and extent of the 
risks in the entity’s customer base, products and services and the geographical locations in which the 
bank and its customers do business; iv) evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness in implementation of 
the controls (including CDD measures) designed by the bank in meeting its AML/CFT obligations and 
risk mitigation; and v) utilise this information to allocate the resources, scope the review, identify the 
necessary supervisory expertise and experience needed to conduct an effective review and allocate these 
resources relative to the identified risks. 
84. Higher-risk lines of business or customer categories may require specialised expertise and 
additional procedures to ensure an effective review. The bank’s risk profile should also be used in 
determining the frequency and timing of the supervisory cycle. Again, banks dealing with higher risk 
profiles may require more frequent review than others. Supervisors should also verify whether banks 
have adequately used their discretion with regard to applying AML/CFT on a risk-based approach. They 
should also evaluate the internal controls in place and how banks determine whether they are in 
compliance with supervisory and regulatory guidance, and prescribed obligations. The supervisory 
process should include not only a review of policies and procedures but also, when appropriate, a review 
of customer documentation and the sampling of accounts and transactions, internal reports and 
suspicious transaction reports. Supervisors should always have the right to access all documentation 
related to the transactions conducted or accounts maintained in that jurisdiction, including any analysis 
the bank has made to detect unusual or suspicious transactions. 
85. Supervisors have a duty to ensure their banks maintain sound ML/FT risk management not only 
to protect their own safety and soundness but also to protect the integrity of the financial system.34 
Supervisors should make it clear that they will take appropriate action, which may be severe and public if 
the circumstances warrant, against banks and their officers who demonstrably fail to follow their own 
internal procedures and regulatory requirements. In addition, supervisors (or other relevant national 
authorities) should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures and ensure that banks are aware of 
and apply enhanced CDD measures to business relationships and to transactions when called for by the 
FATF or that involve jurisdictions where their AML/CFT standards are considered inadequate by the 
country. In this aspect, the FATF and some national authorities have listed a number of countries and 
jurisdictions that are considered to have strategic AML/CFT deficiencies or that do not comply with 
 
31  Supervisors should also take into account the risk-based approach to supervision described in Interpretive Note 26 in the 
FATF Standards. 
32  For this, it is expected that supervisors would build on countries’ assessment such as described in the interpretative note to 
recommendation 1 in the FATF standards.  
33  Including, where appropriate, any supranational risk assessment. 
34  Many supervisors also have a duty to report any suspicious, unusual or illegal transactions that they detect, for example, 
during on-site examinations. 
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international AML/CFT standards,35 and such findings should be a component of a bank's ML/FT risk 
management. 
86. Supervisors should also consider a bank’s overall monitoring and oversight of compliance at 
the branch and subsidiary level as well as the ability of group policy to accommodate local regulatory 
requirements and ensure that where there is a difference between the group and local requirements, the 
stricter of the two is applied. Supervisors should also ensure that in cases where the group branch or 
subsidiary cannot apply the stricter of the two standards, the reasons for this and the differences 
between the two should be documented and appropriate mitigating measures implemented to address 
risks identified as a result of those differences. 
87. In a cross-border context, home country supervisors36 should face no impediments in verifying 
a bank’s compliance with group-wide AML/CFT policies and procedures during on-site inspections. This 
may well require a review of customer files and a sampling of accounts or transactions in the host 
jurisdiction. Home country supervisors should have access to information on sampled individual 
customer accounts and transactions and on the specific domestic and international risks associated with 
such customers to the extent necessary to enable a proper evaluation of the application of CDD 
standards and an assessment of risk management practices. This use of information for a legitimate 
supervisory need, safeguarded by the confidentiality provisions applicable to supervisors, should not be 
impeded by local bank secrecy or data protection laws. Although the host country supervisors and/or 
other authorities retain responsibility for the enforcement of compliance with local AML/CFT 
requirements (which would include an evaluation of the appropriateness of the procedures), host 
country supervisors should ensure they extend full cooperation and assistance to home country 
supervisors who may need to assess how the bank oversees compliance with group-wide AML/CFT 
policies and processes. 
88. The role of group audit (external or internal) is particularly important in assessing the 
effectiveness of AML/CFT policies and procedures. Home country supervisors should ensure that there is 
an appropriate policy, based on the risks, and adequate resources allocated regarding the scope and 
frequency of audit of the group’s AML/CFT. They should also ensure that auditors have full access to all 
relevant reports during the audit process. 
89. Supervisors should ensure that information about banks’ customers and transactions is subject 
to the same confidentiality measures as are applicable to the broad array of information shared between 
supervisors on banks’ activities. 
90. It is essential that all jurisdictions that host foreign banks provide an appropriate legal 
framework to facilitate the passage of information required for customer risk management purposes to 
the head office or parent bank and home country supervisors. Similarly, there should be no impediments 
to on-site visits to host jurisdiction subsidiaries and branches by home jurisdiction head office auditors, 
 
35 For instance, jurisdictions may be publicly identified by : 
- the FATF’s Public Statement, which identifies: 
1)  jurisdictions that have strategic AML/CFT deficiencies and to which countermeasures apply; 
2)  jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies that have not made sufficient progress in addressing the 
deficiencies or have not committed to an action plan developed with the FATF to address the deficiencies. 
- The FATF public document, Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-going Process, which identifies jurisdictions with 
strategic AML/CFT deficiencies that have provided a high-level political commitment to address the deficiencies through 
implementation of an action plan developed with the FATF. 
36  In those countries where the examination process is undertaken by external auditors, this exemption should also apply to the 
competent auditors. 
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risk managers, compliance officers (including the chief AML/CFT officer and/or AML/CFT group officer), 
or home country supervisors, nor any restrictions in their ability to access all the host jurisdiction bank’s 
records, including customers’ names and balances. This access should be the same for both branches 
and subsidiaries. If impediments to information sharing prove to be insurmountable, and there are no 
satisfactory alternative arrangements, the home supervisors should make it clear to the host supervisor 
that the bank may be subject to additional supervisory actions, such as enhanced supervisory measures 
on the group, including, as appropriate, requesting the parent group to close down its operations in the 
host jurisdiction. 
91. Where a bank’s head office staff are granted access to information on local customers, there 
should be no restrictions on them reporting such information back to head office. Such information 
should be subject to adequate safeguards on confidentiality and use and may be subject to applicable 
privacy and privilege laws in the home country. 
92. The Committee believes that there is no justifiable reason why local legislation should impede 
the transfer of customer information from a host bank branch or subsidiary to its head office or parent 
bank in the home jurisdiction for risk management purposes, including ML and FT risks. If the law in the 
host jurisdiction restricts disclosure of such information to “third parties”, it is essential that the head 
office or parent bank and the home jurisdiction bank supervisors are clearly excluded from definitions of 
a third party. Jurisdictions that have legislation that impedes, or can be interpreted as impeding, such 
information-sharing for ML/FT risk management purposes, are urged to remove any such restrictions 
and to provide specific gateways appropriate for this purpose. 
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Annex 1 
Using another bank, financial institution or third party to perform 
customer due diligence 
I. Introduction 
1. In some countries, banks are permitted to use other banks, financial institutions or other 
entities to perform customer due diligence (CDD). These arrangements can take various forms but in 
essence usually fall into one of the following two situations: 
Reliance on third parties 
2. Banks in some countries are allowed to rely on CDD performed by other financial institutions or 
designated non-financial businesses and professions who are themselves supervised or monitored for 
AML/CFT purposes. 37  In these situations, the third party will usually have an existing business 
relationship with the customer, and the banks may be exempt from applying their own CDD measures at 
the beginning of the relationship. The FATF standards38 permit reliance for these aspects:   
(a)  Identifying the customer and verifying that customer’s identity using reliable, independent 
source documents, data or information.  
(b)  Identifying the beneficial owner, and taking reasonable measures to verify the identity of the 
beneficial owner, such that the financial institution is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial 
owner is. For legal persons and arrangements this should include financial institutions 
understanding the ownership and control structure of the customer.  
(c)  Understanding and, as appropriate, obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature 
of the business relationship.   
FATF standards further require that a financial institution relying upon a third party should immediately 
obtain the necessary information concerning these three CDD measures.  
3. Some countries restrict the ability to rely in various ways; for example, limiting reliance to 
financial institutions, allowing reliance only for third parties’ existing relationships (and prohibiting chains 
of reliance) or not allowing reliance on foreign entities.  
Outsourcing/agency 
4. Banks may also use third parties to perform various elements of their CDD obligations on a 
contractual basis, often in an outsourcing/agent relationship (the outsourced entity applies the CDD 
 
37  See Recommendation 17 in the FATF Standards and its interpretative note. 
38  See Recommendation 17 and Recommendation 10 on CDD in the FATF Standards. 
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measures on behalf of the delegating bank). Typically, there are fewer restrictions on who can act as the 
agent of a bank, but this is often offset by prescribed arrangements and record keeping.  
5. For both reliance and outsourcing, banks may choose to limit the size, scope or nature of 
transaction types when utilising third parties. In all cases, supervisors should have timely access to 
customer information upon request. Although these two categories seem similar or related, there are 
significant differences between them and banks should ensure they understand those differences and 
reflect these in their policies and procedures. 
II. Reliance on third parties 
6. Banks should have clear policies and procedures on whether and when it is acceptable and 
prudent to rely on another bank or financial institution. Such reliance in no way relieves the bank of its 
ultimate responsibility for having adequate CDD policies and procedures and other AML/CFT 
requirements on customers, such as understanding expected activity, whether customers are high-risk, 
and whether transactions are suspicious.  
7. In depending on another bank or financial institution to conduct certain aspects of CDD, banks 
should assess the reasonableness of such reliance. In addition to ensuring there is a legal ability to rely, 
relevant criteria for assessing reliance include: 
• The bank, financial institution or other entity (as permitted by national law) on which reliance is 
placed should be as comprehensively regulated and supervised as the bank, have comparable 
customer identification requirements at account opening and have an existing relationship with 
the customer opening an account at the bank. Alternatively, national law may require the use of 
compensating measures or controls, in cases where these standards are not met.   
• The bank and the other entity should have an arrangement or understanding in writing 
acknowledging the bank’s reliance on the other financial institution’s CDD processes.   
• The bank’s procedures and policies should document the reliance and should establish 
adequate controls and review procedures for such a relationship.   
• Third parties may be required to certify to the bank that it has implemented its AML 
programme, and that it performs CDD substantially equivalent to or consistent with the bank`s 
obligations.  
• The bank should give due consideration to adverse public information about the third party, 
such as its subjection to an enforcement action for AML deficiencies or violations.   
• The bank should identify and mitigate any additional risk posed by reliance on multiple parties 
(a chain of reliance) rather than a direct relationship with one entity.   
• The bank’s risk assessment should identify reliance on third parties as a potential risk factor.   
• The bank should periodically review the other entity to ensure that it continues to conduct CDD 
in a manner as comprehensive as the bank. For that purpose, the bank should obtain all the 
CDD information and documents from the bank, financial institution,or entity that it relies upon 
and assess due diligence done, including screening against local databases to ensure 
compliance with local regulatory requirements. 
• Banks should consider terminating reliance on entities that do not apply adequate CDD on their 
customers or otherwise fail to meet requirements and expectations.    
8. Banks with subsidiaries or branches outside the home jurisdiction frequently use the financial 
group to introduce their customers to other parts of the financial group. In countries that permit this 
cross-border reliance on affiliates, financial institutions that rely on other parts of the group for customer 
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identification should ensure that the above assessment criteria are in place. The FATF standards39 allow 
countries to exempt country risk from this assessment if the financial institution is subject to group-wide 
AML/CFT standards and supervised on a group level by its financial supervisor. 
III. Outsourcing/agency 
9. Banks may choose to apply identification and other CDD processes directly or can appoint one 
or more third parties to take these measures on their behalf, sometimes in an agent relationship. While 
AML/CFT compliance functions may be performed by third parties, the responsibility for complying with 
CDD and AML/CFT requirements remains with the bank. The extent of the use of third parties usually 
depends on the business model of the bank; normally, banks that operate by telephone or over the 
internet or that have few “bricks & mortar” branches tend to use third parties to a greater extent. Banks 
may use third parties to expand their customer base or improve customer support and overall access to 
their services. 
10. Banks that choose to use third parties should ensure that a written agreement is in place that 
sets out the AML/CFT obligations of the bank and how these will be executed by the third party. In some 
countries, the relationship between banks and their third parties is regulated. 
11. As noted above, it is important for banks to understand the difference between using a third 
party as its agent and relying on another bank’s customer identification and CDD processes. An agent is 
usually, under the law of agent and principal, a legal extension of the bank. When a bank’s customer or 
potential customer deals with an agent of a bank, it is legally dealing with the bank itself. The third party 
will therefore be obligated to apply the bank’s policies and requirements with respect to identification 
and verification and CDD.  
12. In practice, banks’ third parties need to have the necessary technical expertise, knowledge and 
training to apply customer identification and CDD measures of the bank. In some cases, where third 
parties’ business models are based on acting for several banks, they usually develop significant in-house 
expertise of their own. However, third parties are not always themselves subject to AML/CFT obligations, 
although many often are. Whether or not this is the case, however, the third party is always in the 
position of applying its principal’s identification and CDD requirements (which in turn must conform to 
legal requirements). 
13. Examples of third parties routinely used by banks to apply their customer identification 
obligations include retail deposit brokers, mortgage brokers and solicitors. ML/FT risk mitigation can be 
compromised when banks do not ensure that applicable customer identification requirements and CDD 
are applied by their third parties. 
14. As noted, there should be a written agreement or arrangement documenting the third party’s 
responsibilities, which should include the following:   
• requiring the application of the bank’s customer identification and CDD requirements (including 
as appropriate);  
• ensuring that, where the customer is present in person at the time customer identification 
and/or CDD measures are conducted, the third party applies customer identification procedures 
 
39  See Recommendation 17 in the FATF Standards. 
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that include viewing original identification documents where this is required by regulations or 
the bank;  
• ensuring that, where the customer is not present at the time customer identification is 
ascertained, the third party applies any applicable prescribed or bank-stipulated non-face-to-
face identification requirements; and 
• ensuring that the third party maintains the confidentiality of customer information. 
15. Banks should also: 
• ensure that if the third party is responsible for determining and/or identifying the beneficial 
owner or a PEP determination, these responsibilities are documented; 
• ensure that the third party provides the bank with customer identification information in the 
required time frames; and 
• periodically review or audit, in a systemic manner, the quality of customer information gathered 
and documented by the third party to ensure that it continues to meet the bank’s requirements; 
• clearly identify instances that the bank would consider failures on the part of the third party to 
perform its duties as contracted and establish a process for implementing appropriate actions, 
such as terminating the relationship in response to identified failures. 
16. The bank should obtain all relevant information from the third party in a timely manner and 
ensure the information is complete and kept up to date in the bank’s customer record.   
17. Contracts with third parties should be reviewed and updated as necessary to ensure that they 
continue to address the third parties’ role accurately and reflect any updates to duties.   
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Annex 2 
Correspondent banking 
I.  General considerations on correspondent banking 
1. According to the FATF Glossary, “correspondent banking is the provision of banking services by 
one bank (the “correspondent bank”) to another bank (the “respondent bank”)”.  
2. Used by banks throughout the world, correspondent accounts enable respondent banks to 
conduct business and provide services40 that they cannot offer directly (because of the lack of an 
international network). Correspondent accounts that merit particular care involve the provision of 
services in jurisdictions where the respondent banks have no physical presence.  
3. The correspondent bank processes/executes transactions for customers of the respondent. The 
correspondent bank generally does not have direct business relationships with the customers of the 
respondent bank, who may be individuals, corporations or financial services firms. The customer of the 
correspondent bank is the respondent bank. 
4. Because of the structure of this activity and the limited available information regarding the 
nature or purposes of the underlying transactions, correspondent banks may be exposed to specific 
money-laundering and financing of terrorism risks (ML/FT risks).  
II. Correspondent banking ML/FT risk assessment – information 
gathering 
5. Banks that undertake correspondent banking activities should conduct an appropriate 
assessment of the ML/FT risks associated with correspondent banking activities and consequently apply 
appropriate customer due diligence (CDD) measures.  
6. Correspondent banks should gather sufficient information, at the beginning of the relationships 
and on a continuing basis after that, about their respondent banks to fully understand the nature of the 
respondent’s business and correctly assess ML/FT risks on an ongoing basis. 
7. Factors that correspondent banks should consider include:  
• the jurisdiction in which the respondent bank is located;  
• the group to which the respondent bank belongs, and the jurisdictions in which subsidiaries 
and branches of the group may be located; 
 
40  Such as “cash management (eg interest-bearing accounts in a variety of currencies), international wire transfers, cheque 
clearing, payable-through accounts and foreign exchange services” as mentioned in the FATF Glossary. 
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• information about the respondent bank’s management and ownership (especially the presence 
of beneficial owners or PEPs), its reputation,41 its major business activities, its customers and 
their locations; 
• the purpose of the services provided to the respondent bank; 
• the bank’s business including target markets and customer base; 
• the condition and quality of banking regulation and supervision in the respondent’s country 
(especially AML/CFT laws and regulations); 
• the money-laundering prevention and detection efforts of the respondent bank;  
• a description of the CDD applied by the respondent bank to its customers; 
• the identity of any third-party entities that will use the correspondent banking services;  
• information on any possibility of a chain of correspondent banking. 
8. Information on the AML/CFT policies and procedures may rely on any questionnaire filled by 
the respondent or on publicly available information provided by the respondent (such as financial 
information or any mandatory supervisory information). 
III. Customer due diligence requirements  
9. If correspondent banks fail to apply an appropriate level of due diligence to correspondent 
banking relationships, they may find themselves holding and/or transmitting money linked to illegal 
activity. 
10. All correspondent banking relationships should be subject to an appropriate level of CDD. 
Banks should not treat the CDD process as a “paper gathering exercise” but as a real assessment of ML 
risk. The gathering of information should be finalised, if necessary, based on meeting with the local 
regulator/supervisor, financial intelligence units and relevant governmental agencies.  
11. CDD information should also be reviewed and updated on a regular basis, in accordance with 
the risk-based approach. This information should be used to update the banks’ risk assessment process. 
IV. Customer acceptance 
12. The decision to accept (or continue) a correspondent banking relationship should be approved 
at senior level of the correspondent bank.  
13. Information may be provided by FATF mutual evaluation reports and statements on 
jurisdictions identified by the FATF as either being subject to countermeasures or having strategic 
AML/CFT deficiencies. Mutual evaluation reports by FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) may also provide 
such information. Any publicly available information from competent national authorities may also be 
used by banks. The fact that a country is subject to restrictive measures, particularly if there are 
prohibitions on providing correspondent banking services, should be taken into account. Correspondent 
 
41  Reputation may include civil, administrative or criminal actions/sanctions (fines, blame etc) that have been pronounced by 
any court or supervisory authority. 
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banks should pay particular attention when establishing or continuing relationships with respondent 
banks located in jurisdictions that have deficient AML/CFT standards or have been identified as being 
“non-cooperative” in the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing.  
14. Correspondent banks should refuse to enter into or continue a correspondent banking 
relationship with a bank incorporated in a jurisdiction in which it has no physical presence and which is 
unaffiliated with a regulated financial group (ie shell banks).  
V. Ongoing monitoring 
15. A correspondent bank should establish appropriate policies and procedures to be able to 
detect any activity that is not consistent with the purpose of the services provided to the respondent 
bank or any activity that is contrary to commitments that may have been concluded between the 
correspondent and the respondent. 
16. If a correspondent bank decides to allow correspondent accounts be used directly by third 
parties to transact business on their own behalf (eg payable-through accounts), it should conduct 
enhanced monitoring of these activities in line with their specific risks. The correspondent bank should 
verify that the respondent bank has conducted adequate CDD on the customers having direct access to 
accounts of the correspondent bank, and that the respondent bank is able to provide relevant CDD 
information upon request to the correspondent bank.  
17. Senior management should be regularly informed of high-risk correspondent banking 
relationships and how they are monitored.  
VI. Group-wide and cross-border considerations  
18. If a respondent bank has correspondent banking relationships with several entities belonging to 
the same group42 (case 1), the head office of the group should pay particular attention that the 
assessments of the risks by the different entities of the group are consistent with the group-wide risk 
assessment policy. The head office of the group should coordinate the monitoring of the relationship 
with the respondent bank, in particular in case of high-risk relationship, and make sure that adequate 
information sharing mechanisms inside the group are in place.  
 
42  Each entity provides correspondent banking service in their host country.  
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Case 1 
19. If a correspondent bank has business relationships with several entities belonging to the same 
group but established in different host countries (case 2), the correspondent bank should take into 
account the fact these entities belong to the same group. Nevertheless, the correspondent bank should 
also assess the ML/FT risks presented by each business relationship.  
Case 2 
 
Respondent 
bank 
 
Country Z 
Subsidiary A3 – Country U 
Subsidiary A2 – Country H 
Head office of Group A – 
  
Subsidiary A1 – Country C 
Financial Group supervised on a 
consolidated basis or on an under-
consolidated basis 
C
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
e
n
t    
 
b
a
n
k
i
n
g 
Head office Group 
business Relationship 
Manager 
Head office Group 
AML-CFT Compliance 
Officer 
C
o
r 
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
e
n
t  
 
b
a
n
ki
n
g 
Correspondent 
bank  
 
Country F 
Respondent bank B Head 
office of Group – Country G 
 
Respondent bank  
Subsidiary B1 – Country K 
Respondent bank 
Subsidiary B2 – Country S 
Foreign Financial Group 
Business 
Relationship 
Manager 
AML-CFT 
Compliance Officer 
 28 Sound management of risks related to money laundering and financing of terrorism 
 
 
VII. Risk management 
20. A bank should establish specific procedures to manage correspondent banking relationships. 
Business relationships should be formalised in written agreements that clearly define the roles and 
responsibilities of the banking partners. 
21. Senior management should also be aware of the responsibilities and the role of the different 
services (business lines, compliance officers (including the chief AML/CFT officer or group AML/CFT 
officer), audit, etc) within the bank relative to correspondent banking activities. 
22. A bank’s internal audit and compliance functions43 have important responsibilities in evaluating 
and ensuring compliance with procedures related to correspondent banking activities. Internal controls 
should cover identification measures of the respondent banks, the collection of information, the ML/FT 
risk assessment process and the ongoing monitoring of correspondent banking relationships. 
 
  
 
43  See The internal audit function in banks, June 2012 and BCP 26 on internal control and audit in Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision, September 2012. 
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Annex 3 
List of relevant FATF recommendations 
 
FATF new recommendations 
(including their interpretative notes) 
• R. 1: Assessing risks and applying a risk based approach 
• R. 2: National cooperation and coordination 
• R. 9: Financial institution secrecy law 
• R. 10: Customer due diligence 
• R. 11: Record keeping 
• R. 12: PEPs 
• R. 13: Correspondent banking 
• R.15: New technologies 
• R. 16: Wire transfers 
• R. 17: Reliance on third parties 
• R. 18: Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries 
• R.20: Reporting of suspicious transactions 
• R. 26: Regulation and supervision of financial institutions 
• R. 40: International cooperation 
 
 
